Financial regulators in Australia and overseas are requiring banks to raise additional capital. The benefits of this are understood in terms of reducing the risk of incurring the significant costs of another financial crisis. But there are potential costs from securing these benefits, in the form of unanticipated macroeconomic impacts as banks reduce leverage ratios. In this paper, we explore the economic consequences of a 100 basis point increase in commercial bank capital adequacy ratios using a financial computable general equilibrium model of the Australian economy. We find that the macroeconomic consequences of the policy are small. Our results suggest that prudential regulators can move forward to secure the financial system stability benefits that they expect from higher capital adequacy requirements, without concern that significant costs will be imposed on the wider economy in the form of macroeconomic disruption.
Introduction
Following the events of 2008 and their aftermath, regulators are focused on reducing risks of another financial crisis. Policies affecting commercial bank leverage are important instruments in this regard.
This follows from the role played by counterparty risk perceptions in the 2008 crisis. As described in IMF (2009) , after approximately a year in which developed economy growth was slow due to U.S. mortgage market concerns, the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 precipitated a swift deterioration in financial market conditions. Counterparty risk perceptions peaked as bank asset values were written down, the U.S. Federal government underwrote short-falls in AIG's capacity to honour its insurance obligations, a number of prominent investment banks received emergency lines of credit from the Federal Reserve, and other private and semi-private institutions in the U.S. and Europe deemed systemically important were provided with government financial support (IMF 2009 ).
The crisis in financial markets quickly spilled to the real economy. A measure of the early assessments of the extent of the economic damage caused by the financial crisis can be seen in the IMF's April 2009 forecast for global real GDP growth, which they put at -1.3% (IMF 2009: xii) . The realised growth rate for the year was ultimately lower, at -1.7% (UN 2015) . These global figures obscure the severe impacts in those countries most directly affected by the financial crisis. Edey financial assets fell in the U.S., the euro area, the U.K., and Japan by 8 per cent, 6 per cent, 8 per cent, and 5 per cent respectively. Losses continued into the fourth quarter of 2008 with further falls in the value of financial assets. Real asset prices also fell, with falls in house prices in the U.S., the U.K., and many other developed economies.
The IMF forecasts shed some light on the magnitude of the departure of actual output from potential output. However Ball (2014) raises the possibility that the financial crisis might have generated a persistent reduction in potential output relative to its pre-crisis trend. While details differ across the 23 OECD countries studied by Ball, in general he finds that the fall in potential output relative to the level it would otherwise have attained in the absence of the financial crisis is of approximately the same magnitude as the reduction in actual output relative to potential. Aggregating across the 23 countries of his sample, he finds an average reduction in potential output relative to its pre-crisis trend of approximately 8.4% in 2015. To put this in context, Ball notes that this is approximately equal to the share of the annual GDP of Germany in the sample. Atkinson et al. (2013) argue that the benefits of avoiding financial crises can be understood in terms of avoiding the deep and long-lasting impacts on employment and national income that they cause.
They estimate the losses for the U.S. economy at between 40 per cent and 90 per cent of one year's worth of output, or approximately $50,000-$120,000 per household. As they put it, estimates like this are helpful to policy makers, because they provide a measure of the potential benefits against which the costs of policies aimed at avoiding such financial crisis in the future can be weighed.
While Australia was spared economic damage of the magnitudes visited on the U.S. and many countries in Europe, it was not immune. Real GDP fell -0.8% in the September quarter of 2008, but then grew slowly in the following three quarters, providing a low but positive growth rate of 1.1 per cent in the year to September 2009. The unemployment rate increased by approximately one and onehalf percentage points, rising from 4.3 per cent in September 2008, to 5.7 per cent by September 2009, with a peak in the intervening quarters at 5.9 per cent in June. Edey (2014) argues that one of the factors that insulated Australia from the worst effects of the financial crisis, in addition to fortuitous strength in the terms of trade, was effective leadership by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). This saw Australian banks enter the crisis with reasonable capital buffers and sound asset positions that were not subject to material price impairments.
Consistent with its statutory purpose to promote financial system stability, APRA continues to monitor and regulate the proportion of commercial bank activities financed by equity. In July 2015 APRA released the results of its comparative study of the capital ratios of Australian and international banks. They noted that the capital ratios of Australia's major commercial banks were approximately 200 basis points short of the level necessary to place them in the top quartile of their international banking peers. This has generated policy action in the form of mandating increased risk weights on residential mortgages from July 2016, and a signal of intention over the next several years to see capital adequacy ratios rise by about 200 basis points.
While regulators understand the consequences of alternative capital adequacy ratios for financial sector resilience under various stress test scenarios, and understand the potential wider economic benefits in terms of avoiding economic damage of the scale experienced during the financial crisis, policy makers are less certain about the economic costs of mandating rises in bank capital. Modelling by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS 2010a (BIS , 2010b ) of a 1 percentage point increase in the capital adequacy ratio, phased over four to eight years, suggests a range of potential GDP troughs of between approximately -0.05 per cent and -0.3 per cent at the end of the implementation periods. In this paper, we undertake simulations with a financial CGE model of the Australian economy to explore the economic consequences of a 100 basis point increase in commercial bank capital adequacy ratios. In undertaking these simulations, we build on the financial CGE model described in Dixon et al. (2015) . In particular, building on the model described in Dixon et al. (2015), we: (i) develop the manner in which the commercial banking sector is modelled (particularly as it relates to the modelling of the capital adequacy ratio and risk weights on financial assets held by commercial banks); and (ii) describe central bank setting of the policy rate via a Taylor rule. In the remainder of this paper we summarize the underlying financial CGE model (Section 2), expand on developments to the financial CGE model that are relevant to the current study (Section 2.2), and describe the simulations we have undertaken with the model and what we learn from them (Section 3).
The financial CGE model
In this section we provide a summary of the financial CGE (FCGE) model used in the simulations described in Section 3. For a detailed discussion of the model, we refer the reader to Dixon et al. (2015) . We then go on to describe the developments to the financial CGE model specific to the simulations describing a rise in capital adequacy ratios. We conclude with a discussion of the policy transmission channels embodied within the FCGE model that are relevant to the present simulation.
Overview of the financial CGE model
While fully integrated, the FCGE model can nevertheless be broadly conceived as being comprised of two parts:
A traditional CGE model describing the real side of the economy; and
(ii) A model of the interactions between financial agents and their links with the real side of the economy.
We expand on these two parts, and the important links between them, below.
The real side of the FCGE model is largely as described in Dixon and Rimmer (2002 
3.
A representative household, purchasing domestic and imported commodities for current consumption purposes. Households are also assumed to act as optimisers, maximising utility by choosing between alternative source-specific commodities subject to an aggregate consumption constraint.
4.
A government sector, purchasing domestic and imported commodities for public consumption purposes.
5. An export sector, purchasing units of domestic production, and sensitive to the prices of that production via commodity-specific constant elasticity demand equations.
6.
Providers of margin services (trade, transport, insurance and other margins), required to facilitate flows of commodities between producers, importers, households, government, investors and foreign agents in export markets.
Movements in relative prices reconcile the demand and supply sides of most commodity and factor markets through market clearing conditions. An important exception is the labour market, which is assumed to experience sticky wages in the short-run, but transition in the long run to an environment of wage flexibility and a given natural rate of unemployment. As we shall see, the sticky wage assumption has important consequences in the short-run, because it allows movements in the domestic price level to affect the real producer wage, and thus affect short-run employment. Foreign currency import prices by commodity are determined exogenously. Zero pure profit conditions in current production and capital formation determine basic prices for domestically produced commodities.
Purchases prices differ from basic prices by the value of margin services and indirect taxes. In addition to indirect taxes, government revenue from direct taxes is identified, as are a variety of government outlays beyond public consumption spending (such as personal benefit payments and public investment). Together with variables describing foreign transfer payments, this provides sufficient detail for the identification of the government borrowing requirement, household disposable income, and household savings.
Real-side CGE models with characteristics such as those described above have been used for many decades to answer diverse and important policy questions. Both asset agents and liability agents are assumed to be constrained optimisers. Broadly, liability agents are assumed to minimise the cost of servicing the liabilities they have issued, subject to a constraint that prevents them moving to corner solutions in the issuance of particular financial instruments to particular asset agents. Similarly, asset agents are assumed to maximise the return from their portfolio of financial assets, subject to a constraint that prevents them moving to corner solutions in the holding of particular financial instruments issued by particular liability agents. The solutions to these optimisation problems generate a set of return-sensitive supply equations (governing the issuance of financial instruments by liability agents) and return-sensitive demand equations (governing the demand for financial instruments by asset agents). In general, the joint solution to these supply and demand equations determines rates of return across financial instruments (R (s,f,d) ).
Results from  the public sector borrowing requirement determines new liability issuance by government;
 gross fixed capital formation by industry determines new liability issuance by industry;
 household savings determines new asset acquisitions by households;
 the current account deficit determines new asset acquisitions by foreigners;
 superannuation contributions determine new liability issuance by the superannuation sector;
 changes in the weighted average cost of financial capital influences the desirability of undertaking gross fixed capital formation.
At the same time, important linkages within the financial sector are modelled. For example, the commercial banking sector's roles as both a liability agent and as an asset agent are modelled, allowing detailed representation of the sector's activities in raising local and foreign deposit, bond and equity financing, and deploying the funds thus raised in the purchases of financial instruments such as loans to domestic industry for capital formation, and household mortgages for the purchase of new and existing dwellings. In this system, changes in the prospects for one financial agent can flow through to consequences for the costs of funds to other agents.
Modelling the capital adequacy ratio
Modelling of the capital adequacy ratio requires us to depart, for commercial banks, from the default modelling of asset and liability optimization on the part of financial agents as described in Dixon et al. (2015) . In particular, the theory describing bank decision making over asset ownership must be changed to recognize differences in capital requirements across risky assets. Second, we must activate theory that allows movements in the capital adequacy ratio to affect the amount of equity that banks hold on the liability side of their balance sheets. These two matters are expanded upon below.
Asset demand by commercial banks
To model the effects of the capital adequacy ratio and risk weights on commercial bank behavior, we begin by modifying the standard theory in the FCGE model governing decision making by asset agents. We begin by assuming that the commercial banks (ComB) choose their end-of-year asset portfolio, AT1(s,f,ComB) for all s and f to maximize U(R(s,f ,ComB)*AT1(s,f ,ComB), for all s and f )
(1) subject to
where KAR is the capital adequacy ratio, W(s,f,ComB) is the risk weight that the financial regulator assigns to AT1(s,f,ComB) and AT1zero(ComB,equity,d) is the value of equity the commercial banks would sell in the absence of capital adequacy requirements. We assume that the KAR constraint is binding so
We assume that equity liabilities are expensive. Consequently we approximate problem (1) 
subject to
and  is a positive parameter.
In (6) we recognize that the commercial banks face a penalty when they expand their holding of asset (s,f,ComB). The penalty is that they have to increase expensive equity liability. We model the penalty as proportional to the capital adequacy ratio times the risk weight. The factor of proportionality,  , reflects the difference between the cost of equity finance to the commercial banks and the cost of other liabilities. For example, with  at 0.08, and KAR = 0.1, the penalty for a risky asset with weight 1 (W = 1) would be 0.008. If the capital adequacy ratio were increased to 0.125 then the penalty for risky assets would increase to 0.01 (an increase of 20 basis points), whereas the penalty for a less risky asset (W = 0.1, say) would barely move, from 0.0008 to 0.001 (an increase of 9 2 basis points). By changing the capital adequacy ratio and/or the risk weights the regulator can influence the asset choices of the commercial banks.
Commercial bank liabilities and equity
For details on the modelling of the liability side of commercial bank balance sheets, we refer the reader to Dixon et al. (2015) , particularly pp. 9-10, 12-13 and 17-19. Here, we draw out the key parts of the discussion in that document that are relevant to the current simulation. In particular, we begin by reproducing the following four percentage change equations from Dixon et al. (2015) : 
are the end-of-year holdings by agent d of asset type f issued by agent s; p_eq_bank1 is the percentage change in end-of-year bank equity; p_ratio_t1 is the percentage change in the capital adequacy ratio; (Banks) big_budl_neq is the percentage change in the equity-exclusive value of commercial bank liabilities; (Banks) big_budl is the percentage change in end-of-year (equity-inclusive) commercial bank liabilities; (Banks) ave_ror_sne is the percentage change in the average rate of return on non-equity financial instruments issued by commercial banks as liability agents; (Banks,f,d) roipowl is the percentage change in the power (1 plus the rate) of the rate of interest / return paid to asset agent d on financial instrument f issued by commercial banks as liability agents; (Banks,f) a_t_1_d is the percentage change in end-of-year non-equity liabilities ( f FINEQ  i.e., deposits, loans, and bonds) issued by commercial banks as liability agents; (s,f) roipowl_d is the percentage change in the average power of the rate of interest / return paid by commercial banks on non-equity financing instrument f.
Equation (7) calculates the percentage change in the risk-weighted value of end-of-year commercial bank assets. The risk weight on financial instrument f issued by liability agent s and held as an asset by commercial banks is given by RISKWGT (s,f) . Table 1 reports initial values for the risk weights in Equation (7). In choosing values for RISKWGT (s,f) , we were guided by values reported in Attachments A and D of (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, 2013). Equation (8) calculates the percentage change in end-of-year bank equity as the share weighted sum of the percentage changes in bank equity held by all asset agents. Equation (9) calculates the percentage change in the capital adequacy ratio, defined as the ratio of end-of-year bank equity to risk-weighted assets.
With equation (9) activated, in the sense that p_ratio_t1 is determined exogenously, thus enforcing a given ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets, we must provide for the non-equity component of bank financing to be determined outside of the standard liability optimisation mechanisms summarised in Section 2 above and detailed in Section 3.8 of Dixon et al. (2015) . This is provided by equations (10), (11) and (12). Equation (10) calculates the non-equity financing needs of commercial banks (big_budl_neq (Banks) ) as the difference between total (equity-inclusive) bank financing needs (big_budl (Banks) ) and that part of bank financing needs satisfied by equity. Equation (11) calculates the weighted average value of the cost of non-equity finance to agent (s). Equation (12) establishes bank liability optimising behaviour over the issuance of non-equity financing instruments. (Foreigners,DeposLoans) Loans to foreign agents. 0.4 RISKWGT (Inds,DeposLoans) Loans to domestic industry. 0.4 RISKWGT (NonBankFinIn,DeposLoans) Loans to non-bank financial intermediaries. 0.4 RISKWGT (NRH,DeposLoans) Loans to the non-reproducible housing sector. 0.35 RISKWGT (RH,DeposLoans) Loans to the reproducible housing sector. 0.5 RISKWGT (NonBankFinIn,Bonds) Bonds issued by non-bank financial institutions. 
Central bank policy rate and Taylor rule
In Section 2.1 we introduced the data arrays describing stocks of financial instruments (A (s,f,d) ) and the rates of return on those stocks (R (s,f,d) ). These data include two instruments relevant to the relationships between the central bank and commercial banks as they pertain to the operations of monetary policy within the FCGE model, namely: Taylor rule linking movements in the policy rate to deviations of inflation from target and the 1 R (s,f,d) is defined as the power of the rate of return (i.e. 1 plus the rate) earned by asset agent d on financial instrument f issued by liability agent s. Hence, if the deposit rate for settlement balances with the central bank is 4%, then R (CB,DeposLoans,Banks) = 1.04 and the power of the borrowing rate for settlement balances (R (Banks,DeposLoans,CB) ) is 1.045. 2 We think this is consistent, for example, with the channel system description in Woodford (2003) . He describes a channel system as one in which the central bank supplies a given level of clearing balances at a given policy interest rate, in addition to standing ready to lend clearing balances at a fixed spread over the policy rate (Woodford 2003: 27) . This is also consistent with early descriptions of how the Reserve Bank affects changes in the policy rate. For example, Lowe (1995, p. 3): "Monetary policy operates via the Bank influencing the interest rate paid on overnight funds (the "cash rate")…The Bank's influence over the cash rate comes from its ability to control the availability of funds used to settle transactions between financial institutions. By undertaking open market operations, principally in government securities with less than one year to maturity, the Bank controls the availability of settlement funds and hence the interest rate paid on overnight deposits". 13 employment rate from the natural rate. As Orphanides (2007) describes, Taylor rules are simple prescriptive policy rules describing how a central bank should adjust its policy interest rate in response to movements in inflation and economic activity. The "classic Taylor rule" proposed by Taylor (1993) is:
where r is the federal funds rate, p is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters, "2" denotes an assumed natural real rate for the policy rate of 2 per cent per annum (in the first bracketed term) and a target inflation rate of 2 per cent per annum (in the second bracketed term), and y is an output Within the FCGE model, we link movements in the policy interest rate to deviations in the price level from target and output from potential via the following adjustment process: ER are the actual and target levels of the employment rate (1-the unemployment rate) in year t, FR is an exogenous shift variable, and  is a parameter, which we set equal to 0.5, governing the sensitivity of interest rate movements to deviations in prices and employment from target. Converting (14) to a percentage rate of change form, we have: percentage changes in the employment rate (1-the unemployment rate) in year t, and fr is a shift variable that is endogenous when the policy rule is inactive and exogenous (and typically unshocked) when the rule is activated. Mishkin (1995) outlines four broad mechanisms via which monetary policy can affect the economy: the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the asset price channel, and the credit channel. As we discuss below, elements of all four channels are evident in the mechanisms operating in the FCGE model.
Monetary and regulatory transmission mechanisms in the FCGE model
The interest rate channel describes the relationship between monetary policy and real activity via the impact of interest rate movements on investment and other interest-sensitive expenditures (such as consumer durable demand) (Mishkin 1995: 4) . This mechanism is present in our FCGE model because investors are assumed to undertake capital formation up to the point where the expected rate of return on new units of physical capital is equal to the weighted average cost of the financial capital issued to finance the activity (see Dixon et al. 2015: 17) . Because the weighted average cost of financial capital is potentially sensitive to monetary policy via changes in bank lending rates (and indeed, via changes in the cost of other forms of financial capital), the interest rate channel is a potentially relevant mechanism in understanding how monetary shocks affect real activity within the FCGE model.
The exchange rate channel describes the capacity of monetary policy to influence real activity via interest rate induced movements in the exchange rate. Mishkin (1995: 5) That is, within the FCGE model, the chain of causation between monetary tightening and real-side variables like GDP and net exports is:
Consistent with Mishkin, the first two steps in the chain link monetary contraction with nominal appreciation. Within the FCGE model, nominal appreciation causes a fall in the domestic price level ( P  ) due to a fall in the domestic price of traded goods. With the nominal wage sticky in the shortrun, this causes the real producer wage to rise ( () W/ P  ), and hence the demand for labour to fall (
L  ). With employment lower, real GDP must fall ( Y  ). With stickiness in public consumption
spending, real GNE is likely to fall by less than the fall in real GDP. Hence the balance of trade is likely to move towards deficit ( NX  ). Hence the exchange rate channel mechanism within the FCGE model anticipates similar impacts on real side variables as those outlined by Mishkin, but places more emphasis on the role of short-run wage stickiness in generating a temporary fall in employment via a rise in the real producer wage. reduces equity prices because the resulting rise in bond prices causes equity prices ( e P ) to fall as investors switch from equities to bonds. This causes Tobin's q to fall, thereby reducing investment as firms find it relatively more attractive to purchase capital by acquiring the equities of existing firms rather than by constructing new physical capital. A similar mechanism operates within the FCGE model. In our model, a rise in interest rates causes the cost of equity finance to rise because firms must offer competitive rates of return when issuing new equity finance. Hence, tight monetary policy raises the weighted average cost of financial capital faced by industries not only because it pushes up the cost of debt finance, but also because the portfolio-switching behavior of financial asset investors forces the issuers of new equity to offer higher rates of return on issues of new equity. As discussed in Dixon et al. (2015: 17) , with investors undertaking gross physical capital formation up to the point where the expected return on physical capital is equal to the weighted average cost of financial capital, a rise in the weighted average cost of financial capital will lower real investment in the FCGE model. The second asset price channel outlined by Mishkin relies on changes in equity values affecting household wealth, and with it, real consumption and real GDP. The FCGE model does not yet contain a direct link between household financial wealth and household consumption. This is a link we plan to explore in future work.
Mishkin identifies two broad credit channels: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel.
The balance sheet channel rests on monetary policy's capacity to affect lending behavior via its impact on firm balance sheets and perceptions of lending risk. For example, as Mishkin argues, a tightening of monetary policy can adversely affect the net worth of firms by lowering their equity prices. The fall in firm net worth can then adversely affect bank lending by raising bank perceptions of adverse selection and moral hazard risks.
The bank lending channel emphasizes the particular role that banks play as intermediaries for certain firms and sectors. As Kashyap and Stein (1994) note, summarizing Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , three conditions must hold for a model to possess a distinct lending channel for monetary policy transmission: (i) liability agents must view as imperfect substitutes financial capital raised by loans from commercial banks and bonds sold to the general public; (ii) commercial banks must view deposit finance and other forms of short-term finance as imperfect substitutes for financial capital; and (iii) there must be a nominal rigidity that prevents monetary shocks from having no impact on the real economy. All three conditions hold in the FCGE model. Condition (i) ensures that borrowers cannot entirely offset a rise in the cost of bank funds by shifting to other sources of financial capital.
Condition (ii) renders the cost of funds to commercial banks sensitive to changes in the costs of particular finance sources (like deposits) by ensuring that they cannot make costless switches between alternative funding sources. Condition (iii) ensures that changes in monetary policy are not immediately neutralized by costless price adjustment. These three conditions hold in the FCGE model, thus allowing a shock directed at commercial banks (like a rise in the capital adequacy ratio) to exert an influence on the cost of financial capital to agents reliant on bank finance (like housing construction).
Simulations

Backround
In July 2015 the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority released the results of its comparative study of the capital ratios of Australian banks and their international peers. They noted that the capital ratios of Australia's major commercial banks were approximately 200 basis points short of the level necessary to place the banks in the top quartile of their international banking peers on this measure (APRA 2015) . In the simulations below, we raise the average capital adequacy ratio by 100 basis points.
Model closure
We make the following closure assumptions:
Wage determination. We assume that the nominal wage is sticky in the short run, but sufficiently flexible over the medium term to ensure that the unemployment rate is returned to its natural rate.
ii) The public sector. We assume that real public consumption spending is unaffected by the movement in the capital adequacy ratio. That is, real public consumption spending follows its baseline path. We assume that the ratio of the public sector borrowing requirement to GDP also follows its baseline path. The exogenous status of both the PSBR / GDP ratio and public consumption spending requires the flexible determination of at least one government revenue raising instrument. To this end, we endogenously determine a direct tax on household income.
iii) The policy interest rate in year t adjusts relative to its t-1 level in response to movements in the consumer price inflation rate away from target, and movements in the employment rate (an output gap measure) away from target.
Results.
The shock is a 100 basis point increase in the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks (Figure 1 ).
Via the mechanisms described in Section 2.2, this causes banks to undertake adjustments to the composition of both the liability and asset sides of their balance sheets. On the liability side, the increase in the capital adequacy ratio causes commercial banks to increase their issuance of equity instruments, and decrease their reliance on deposit and bond financing (Figure 2 ). On the asset side of bank balance sheets, the rise in the capital adequacy ratio induces commercial banks to reduce their holdings of risky assets. We see this expressed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . In Figure 3 , we see a decline in risk-weighted assets relative to total bank assets. In Figure 4 , we see the composition of bank asset holdings shifting away from assets with comparatively high risk weightings (foreign loans, loans to reproducible housing, foreign equity, industry equity) towards those with lower risk weightings (domestic government bonds, loans to non-reproducible housing).
In Figure 2 , we see commercial banks raising additional equity finance, and reducing their demands for deposit and loan finance. To attract asset agents to acquire the new equity, rates of return on bank equity must rise ( Figure 5 ). At the same time, commercial banks reduce their demand for loan and deposit finance, allowing them to secure loan and deposit financing at slightly lower rates of return relative to baseline ( Figure 5 ). Figure 6 reports the deviation in the weighted average cost of capital to commercial banks, which rises relative to baseline as banks increase the equity share of their financing needs. Figure 7 reports the deviations in the financial assets and liabilities of commercial banks. As discussed in Dixon et al. (2015) , commercial banks are assumed to operate under an environment of a fixed difference between the aggregate return they earn on financial assets and the aggregate return they must pay on their financial liabilities. This has the effect of requiring the commercial banks to pass on the increase in the cost of their financial capital (Figure 6 ) to the agents to whom they are lending. This reduces demand for loans from commercial banks, that is, it leads to a contraction in commercial bank ownership of financial assets (Figure 7) . Hence, commercial banks need to raise less financial capital to acquire this smaller pool of financial assets. That is, it leads to a contraction in commercial bank financial liabilities (Figure 7 ). Figure 8 reports the movement in the interest rates that the central bank offers on settlement balance deposits by commercial banks, and charges commercial banks for settlement balance loans. As discussed in Section 2.3, the settlement balance deposit rate is determined by a policy rule in which the central bank policy rate responds to deviations in prices and unemployment from target. The movements in the policy rate reported in Figure 8 are small: a 0.6 basis point reduction in the year the policy is implemented, with this rising to a +0.1 basis point positive deviation by the end of the simulation period. This is very close to the central bank simply maintaining its baseline path for the policy rate. Figure 9 reports the movements in the price level and the employment rate that are driving, via the policy adjustment rule, the movements in the policy rate reported in Figure 8 . In the year the capital adequacy ratio is increased, both the employment rate and the consumption price deflator fall relative to baseline ( Figure 9 ). This accounts for the initial negative deviation in the policy rate (Figure 8 ). Thereafter, both the consumption deflator and the employment rate return to baseline. This accounts for the return of the policy rate towards baseline. By the end of the simulation period, the employment rate has returned to baseline, and the consumption price deflator is slightly per cent when the target is 2.5 per cent.
As discussed in reference to Figure 4 , the rise in the capital adequacy ratio induces commercial banks to reduce lending to reproducible and non-reproducible housing and industry. These agents can substitute towards other sources of financial capital, however their ability to do so is constrained, and as such, the reductions in bank lending have consequences for their capacity to finance physical capital formation. This is clear from Figure 10 , which reports gross fixed capital formation for housing and non-housing investment. Turning to Table 1 , the assumed risk weight on lending to reproducible housing is slightly higher than that on lending to industry. This explains part of the deeper negative deviation in gross fixed capital formation in housing investment relative to nonhousing investment in Figure 10 . However another important factor is the ability of housing and nonhousing liability agents to substitute away from bank finance. For housing investment, opportunities in this regard are limited: approximately one half of the sector's capital formation is financed by bank lending, with another one third financed via household equity. Outside of housing, bank financing accounts for approximately one quarter of the capital required to finance investment, with other sources like foreign markets and domestic superannuation satisfying, respectively, approximately one third and one tenth of non-housing investment financing needs. As is clear from Figure 10 , with both components of aggregate investment (i.e., both housing and non-housing investment) below baseline, so too is aggregate investment. Figure 11 reports the deviations in real GDP, employment, capital, and investment. In the simulation's first year, the physical capital stock cannot change from baseline. However a small negative employment deviation in the simulation's first year generates a small negative deviation in real GDP in that year. Thereafter, employment gradually returns to baseline. However, the negative deviation in aggregate real investment causes the aggregate capital stock to fall relative to baseline (Figure 11 ).
This causes a negative deviation in real GDP in the medium to longer-term of the order of -0.005 per cent, despite the return of employment to baseline. Figure 12 reports real GDP, real GNE, and the components of real GNE (private and public consumption spending, and investment). As is clear from Figure 12 , the deviation in real GNE lies below the deviation in real GDP. This is due to the negative deviations in private consumption spending and real aggregate investment. As discussed above, the increase in the capital adequacy ratio causes bank lending to industry and housing to fall relative to baseline. As can be seen in Figure 12 , the resulting falls in dwelling and non-dwelling investment cause the aggregate investment deviation to lie below the real GDP deviation. This contributes to the GNE deviation lying below the real GDP deviation. Similarly, we see in Figure 12 that the deviation in real private consumption spending lies below the real GDP deviation, thus also contributing to the GNE deviation lying below the real GDP deviation. While real public consumption spending is assumed to remain unchanged from baseline, this is not enough to offset the contributions to the gap between the GNE and GDP deviations made by the declines in real investment and real private consumption spending.
With the real GNE deviation lying below the real GDP deviation, we expect the real balance of trade to move towards surplus. This is confirmed by Figure 13 , where we see a positive deviation in export volumes and a negative deviation in import volumes. The positive deviation in export volumes generates a negative deviation in the terms of trade because exporters must lower the foreign currency prices of their commodities to support the expansion in export volumes. The negative deviation in the terms of trade has consequences for real private consumption spending. In discussing Figure 12 , we noted that the deviation in real private consumption spending was below the deviation in real GDP.
This is because of the decline in the terms of trade. In modelling consumption, we assume that nominal private consumption spending is a fixed proportion of nominal national income. Under this 20 specification, a decline in the terms of trade damps private consumption spending relative to real GDP. Figure 14 explores the implications of reduced bank lending to housing for the composition of the liability side of housing balance sheets. As is clear from Figure 14 , the financing of reproducible housing shifts towards equity and away from loan finance. This suggests a second avenue via which the rise in the capital adequacy ratio potentially improves financial stability. Not only are commercial banks encouraged to finance a greater proportion of their operations by equity, but by raising the cost of bank debt finance, households are also encouraged to finance a greater proportion of their stake in the reproducible housing sector via equity.
Conclusions and future work
Prudential regulators in Australia and many other countries monitor and regulate the proportion of commercial bank activities financed by equity. Their concern is to ensure that banks have sufficient loss-absorbing capital to maintain financial system resilience in the event of adverse shocks to individual banks or the banking system as a whole, with the aim of avoiding in the future economic damage of the magnitudes experienced by advanced economies following the 2008 financial crisis.
But can the raising of commercial bank capital adequacy impose its own adverse macroeconomic costs? We investigate this by examining the effects of a 100 basis point increase in the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks. We find that this has modest macroeconomic impacts while securing a rise in bank capital, a shift in bank lending away from residential housing investment, and a rise in household equity financing of home ownership.
In future work, we plan to extend the modelling reported in this paper in two main directions. First, in this paper our simulations are concerned with investigating the economic costs of raising capital adequacy ratios, while taking as given the idea that financial regulators have a considered view on the benefits, in terms of financial stability, of a given increase in capital requirements. In future work, we expect to investigate the impact on financial stability of changes in the share of equity in commercial bank financing. To do this, we will need to develop the model further, embedding theory explaining how financial stability is affected by changes in equity / debt financing ratios in both commercial banking and housing finance. The aim will be to model factors that can quickly affect financial stability, such as bank runs, or rapid house price deflation. Modelling of the former is likely to require explicit modelling of how the willingness of asset agents to hold commercial bank deposits is a function of perceived bank stability, with one input to these perceptions being the margin of remaining loss absorbing capital. Modelling of the latter is likely to require explicit modelling of real estate bubbles, with a link between asset price growth and commercial bank lending activity.
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The second direction of model development will be in the description of the relationship between central bank announcements and the behavior of financial market participants. In the current model, 
